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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
APPEAL BRIEF 
Case No. 15216 
This is an appeal from a directed verdict in favor of 
defendant on the issue of whether punitive damages should be 
awarded in a suit to rescind an issuance of corporate stock. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In a jury trial, the Trial Court granted appellant's 
motion for a directed verdict rescinding the stock issuance of 
which appellant complained, but also granted defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict on the issue of whether punitive damages 
could be recovered against Defendant-Respondent Craig A. Knight. 
III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the Trial Court's 
directed verdict refusing to permit the jury to consider the 
issue of punitive damages. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent considers appellant's statement of facts to 
be inaccurate and incomplete and, as to certain key statements, 
unsupported by the record. Respondent submits, therefore, the 
following summary of those facts material to the punitive damage; 
issue. 
Plaintiff Savery L. Nash and Defendant Craig A. Knight· 
entered into a series of oral agreements between December of 19;, 
and March of 1975. (Record 3-4, Transcript of Hearing held July 
13 and 14, 1976, pages ll-12.) The parties started a housing 
development, named Fox Hills, and formed a corporation, Craigco, 
Inc., (Exhibit 7) which came to own the Fox Hills project (Ex-
hibit l, Tr. 12-19). Plaintiff Nash claimed that the agreement 
between the parties gave him control of Craigco, Inc. (Record 2 
(paragraph 6); Transcript of Hearing held July 13 and 14, 1976, 
page 21), and that because he did not want to appear as the 
record holder of a majority of Craigco 's stock, he took an optior. 
on 501 of Craigco's 1,000 shares of stock (Transcript of lleui~ 
held July 13 and 14, 1976, page 23, page 107). Plaintiff Nash 
alleged that he had performed his obligations under the agreemer.: 
which he claimed gave him the right to control Craigco, Inc.; ir. 
particular that he had pursued and obtained financing for the 
project (Record 3, paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint). 
-2-
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Defendant Knight denied that Plaintiff Nash had performed his 
part of the agreement or agreements between the parties, and 
especially denied that Mr. Nash provided financing for the 
building project as he agreed to do. (Record 27-28, paragraphs 
5 and 6 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restrain-
ing Order; Record 59-60, paragraph 5 of Second Defense and full 
text of Third Defense; Tr. 5-9). 
At trial, Plaintiff Nash claimed that he agreed only 
to locate sources of financing (Transcript of Hearing held July 
13 and 14, 1976, pages 86-89); while Defendant Knight claimed 
that Hr. Nash had promised to provide the necessary financing, 
and that Mr. Nash had represented that he had ample financial 
assets because he mvned two insurance companies (Tr. 80, 5, 29) 
which Nash had valued at $516,000 on his financial statement 
(Exhibit 55). 
Plaintiff claimed that he performed his part of the 
agreement by arranging for Craigco to obtain "front end money" 
by entering into a limited partnership (Transcript of Hearing 
held July 13 and 14, 1976, pages 12, 27, 20). Defendant Knight 
claimed that the agreement between the parties called for plain-
tiff to provide the funds necessary to finance the project in 
return for obtaining control of Craigco, Inc., and claimed that 
plaintiff breached this agreement when, in order to get the 
necessary financing, he arranged for Craigco to enter a limited 
-3-
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partnership under terms which required Craigco to pay approxi-
mately $55,000 to a corporation apparently wholly owned by 
Plaintiff Nash (Antlers, Inc.) and to a personal friend of Hr. 
Nash's in return for loans totalling $30,000. (Tr. 7, 28, 34-J; 
Exhibit 65 at page 5). 
Defendant Knight also claimed that plaintiff breached 
the agreement at issue by failing to provide those legal and 
negotiating services which he agreed would be part of his con-
tribution to the partnership. ( Tr . 2 2- 2 5 , 2 8 , 31- 3 4) . 
Mr. Knight consulted an attorney and reviewed his 
obligations and duties to Hr. Nash and to Craigco, Inc., and 
at the suggestion of his attorney, elected to transfer to the 
corporation a piece of real property which he and his wife ownei 
in return for 14,700 shares of additional stock. (Tr. 36-37). 
Plaintiff Nash \vas informed of this issuance, and of Hr. Knight'' 
reasons for deciding that Hr. Nash \'lias not entitled to assume 
control of the corporation. (Exhibit 46). 
Hr. Nash then brought this suit to set aside the issu· 
ance of the additional shares of stock, and to require transfer 
to him of sufficient stock to give him voting control of Craigcc 
Inc. The Trial Court declined to submit to the jury the questic: 
of whether Mr. Nash had performed his part of the oral agreement 
or agreements between himself and Hr. Knight. The Trial Court 
apparently based its ruling on the fact that the company's book! 
-4-
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indicated that at the time the additional stock was issued, 
the reduction thus caused in the value of Mr. Nash's interest 
in Craigco was disproportionate to the value of the property 
J; transferred to Craigco in return for the additional stock. 
1ed 
lt'; 
(Tr. 16-23 [Second portion of transcript]). 
After subsequent motions and hearings on the form of 
relief which should be ordered, the Trial Court entered judgment 
ordering Defendant Knight to rescind the issuance of the addi-
tional stock, to convey to Plaintiff Nash 501 shares of the 
remaining 1,000 shares of Craigco's stock, and denying Plaintiff 
Nash's claim for punitive damages. (Record 252-53). 
V. ARGUHENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THERE 
vJAS NO EVIDENCE FROM HHICH THE JURY 
COULD FIND THAT DEFENDANT CRAIG A. I:<J.\IIGHT 
ACTED MALICIOUSLY IN ISSUING ADDITIONAL 
SHARES OF STOCK IN CRAIGCO, INC. 
The evidence in this case shows that Defendant Knight's 
action in issuing additional shares of stock was based on a good 
su· faith claim that Plaintiff Nash had breached the agreement or 
er agreements under which Mr. Nash claimed the right to take control 
gee of Craigco, Inc. This action was taken on the advice of counsel, 
tic and was communicated to Plaintiff Nash under circumstances which 
1enr permitted him to challenge Mr. Knight's actions by filing this 
t suit less than two months after the issuance of the extra stock. 
,ok: (Record 26-27, Record 6). The issuance of the additional stock, 
-5-
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even though now adjudged a wrongful act, is not a sufficient 
basis to award punitive damages. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 U.2d 
165, 514 P. 2d 1284 (1973). In the Amoss case, the trial court 
permitted an award of compensatory damages based on the jury 
having found that defendant had converted some cattle belonging 
to plaintiff. The Amoss trial court also permitted the jury to 
award punitive damages based on defendant's act of converting 
the cattle. This Court affirmed the award of compensatory 
damages based on the conversion, but reversed the award of 
punitive damages on the ground that, although the record showed 
that the defendant had behaved in a somewhat high handed way, 
the record also showed that defendant had acted under a claim 
of right. Having acted under a claim of right, albeit a claim 
which later was held to be unfounded, the defendant's conduct 
was held to be inconsistent, as a matter of law, with the kind 
of wanton or malicious conduct required to sustain an a>.;rard of 
punitive damages. 
The case of Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. 2d 354 (1975) helc 
that punitive damages could be awarded where the evidence "was 
so substantial and persuasive that it could hardly be open to 
doubt .... " That the defendant knew at the time he acted (also 
to take possession of some cattle) that he had no good fai~ c~ 
to the cattle. In Kesler, this finding was predicated primu~ 
on the fact that the defendant had represented that he owned tf,c 
-6-
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brand which was on the cattle in question. It was readily 
determined that defendant ovmed no such brand, and the jury 
also answered interrogatories finding that defendant had knowl-
edge, before the acts complained of, that he had no good faith 
claim to ownership of the cattle. 542 P.2d at 358-359. 
The Kesler case does not purport to overrule the Amoss 
opinion of two years earlier, so it would appear that the two 
cases should be construed in a harmonious way. The synthesis 
which results from reading the two cases together appears to be 
that unless the evidence compels the conclusion that the claim 
of right is made fraudulently or in bad faith, action taken pur-
suant to a claim of right cannot be the basis for punitive damages. 
This interpretation is consistent with the comment in the Kesler 
opinion to the effect that punitive damages are an extraordinary 
remedy which should be applied with caution. 524 P.2d at 359. 
Appellant contends at three different places in his 
brief that Hr. Knight's testimony which appears at lines 13 and 
14 of page 61 of the transcript establishes without question the 
proposition that Defendant Knight knew when he issued the addi-
tional stock that the issuance would be set aside. This conten-
tion is not supported by the record. In the testimony upon which 
appellant relies so heavily and exclusively, Mr. Knight said 
[quoting his attorney]: 
A. He said, "It appears like Mr. Nash has 
provided certain legal work. And he 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has provided certain financial assis-
tance even though it seems to be less 
than agreed upon," and that the out-
come of my stock transfer would no 
doubt yield to a lawsuit. 
This response is at least as consistent with the hypothesis that 
Mr. Knight was saying only that he was advised that an issuance 
would lead to, or result in, a lawsuit as it is with appellant's 
hypothesis that it establishes with certainty the proposition 
that Nr. Knight was told that there was no doubt he would lose 
any suit brought to challenge the issuance. There is no doubt 
that Mr. Knight feared that Hr. Hash was predisposed to sue him 
(Tr. 60, lines 8-12), but lines 11-13 of the very passage on 
which appellant relies so strongly states that Hr. Knight's 
attorney was advising him that the finanancial assistance actual 
provided by Mr. Nash seemed to be less than what was agreed upon 
Read as a whole, the pleadings and the transcript simply do not 
support the conclusion that Defendant Knight knew at the time o: 
the stock issue that he had no good faith claim that appellant 
had breached his oral agreement or agreements with defendant. 
It also seems significant that it was Mr. Nash who 
approached Defendant Knight and suggested going into business t: 
gether. (Transcript of Hearing held July 13 and 14, 1976, page 
Mr. Hash was at that time an attorney with some seven years of 
corporate practice (Transcript of Hearing held July 13 and 14, · 
pages 10 and 81). Despite this background, Hr. Nash elected tc 
use an oral agreement, or a series of oral agreements, to ente: 
into business with Mr. Knight. If Mr. Nash had been concerned 
-8-
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to eliminate questions about what he needed to do in order to 
enjoy the benefits of the controlling position into which he 
placed himself, he was uniquely well qualified to do so. Having 
chosen to leave his duties open to the conflicting interpretations 
which should be expected of oral agreements, it seems singularly 
inappropriate for Mr. Nash to contend that the Court should 
readily conclude that Mr. Knight lacked a good faith basis for 
his claim that Mr. Nash had forfeited his right to control of 
Craigco, Inc. 
Appellant presents extensive citations to the effect 
that Defendant Knight was in a position in which he had certain 
fiduciary obligations to appellant. Appellant then cites Holland 
v. Moreton, 10 U.2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960), as if that case 
imposes a different standard for punitive damages where fiduciary 
duties may be held to exist between the parties. Holland v. 
Moreton states no such rule. The Holland opinion states expressly 
that in a case involving claimed breach of fiduciary duty, there 
must be found both a breach of such duty, together with conduct 
malicious in nature. The Holland opinion shows that fiduciary 
duty cases are also subject to the rule stated in Powers v. Taylor, 
14 U.2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963): 
"Whether [punitive] damages are awardable is 
not dependent upon the classification of the 
act, nor upon the nature of the injury, but 
upon the manner and intent with which it is 
done." 14 U.2d at 155. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Measured from the position and perception of Defend~t 
Knight, as of the time he decided to issue additional stock, 
appellant's rights were restricted to those derived from oral 
agreements which apparently established either a partnership or 
joint venture, and which Defendant Knight claimed had been 
breached, and to those derived from an option to purchase corpor< 
stock. These circumstances were inherently ripe with possibiliti 
for dispute as to whether fiduciary duties still existed between 
Knight and Nash. Defendant Knight was advised that his fiduciar 
duty to Mr. Nash would be discharged by informing Nash of the 
share issuance, and that was done within a month of the issuance 
(Tr. 60, Exhibit 46). 
Appellant does not make a showing that the record con· 
tains significant evidence to support the conclusion that Defen· 
dant Knight acted with malice. On the contrary, the record sho•' 
that Mr. Knight believed that appellant had not complied with th 
agreement which gave rise to his having an option to acquire cor: 
trol of Craigco, Inc. (Tr. 62). He was afraid that if he clid 
not act to retain control of the corporation, appellant would 
take control, leaving Defendant Knight personally obligated to 
guarantee the corporation's extensive loans. (Tr. 66, 75-76). 
Mr. Knight sought the advice of counsel and elected to follow 
one of the courses of action suggested to him by counsel. (Tr 
36). Under these circumstances, the Trial Court correctly rule; 
-10-
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(See court's remarks, Tr., second section, at page 12) that 
punitive damages were not allowable. 
2. THIS TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
UNDER UTAH LAW PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE 
NOT ALLOWABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
ACTUAL DAMAGES. 
Appellant states that the Utah Supreme Court has not 
ruled on this issue, and suggests that the Idaho case of Village 
of Peck v. Denison, 92 Ida. 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969) be regarded 
as applicable to the issues raised on this appeal. This argument 
ignores the existence of Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District, 20 U.2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968) which holds that 
punitive damages may not be awarded in the absence of compensatory 
damages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court ruled correctly that punitive damages 
were not allowable in this case. This ruling was in accord with 
the Utah law on this issue, and, more fundamentally, correctly 
reflected those conclusions which could properly be drawn from 
the evidence presented. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~C/~ay of January. 
of and for 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTliT 
Attorneys for Respondent 
141 East First South 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appeal Brief in Case No. 
15216, postage prepaid, this ~'( /'i:day of January, 1978, to 
David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Appellant, at P. 0. Box 11898, 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
